Whispering Death – Australian Airmen in the Pacific War

By Mark Johnston

Allen and Unwin (2011)

This book won me over in the first few pages, when Johnston gave clear explanations to a number of matters I have always wondered about. Why was the Air Force so neglected in the between-the-wars period? Why did Australia not have an aircraft factory or a training facility to turn out flight crews and ground staff in the numbers that a war would require? With war brewing in the Pacific why were trained pilots being sent to Britain? Why were there no Australian officers in charge of Australian squadrons in Europe?

Johnston starts with a detailed background of the period leading up to World War II and the political problems facing the new military branch. There was the British belief that an enemy would have to invade by ship, so a powerful navy based on Singapore would best protect Australia. The Japanese development of aircraft carriers and high performance bomber aircraft was overlooked until the Pearl Harbor attack and by that time Australia was coming to realise it had big problems, starting with lack of aircraft.

This answers another question – why was Darwin undefended by aircraft when it was first bombed? Simple answer – there weren’t any available. On the first attack in February 1942 there was no defensive Australian air cover at all and little antiaircraft equipment. The Japanese were free to complete their mission. That was quickly remedied but the Wirraways, Brewster Buffalos and American P40s were simply outnumbered by Japanese fighters. The situation didn’t change until second-hand Spitfires arrived from Britain and pilots who could fly them returned home. The Spitfires had their problems in tropical conditions and early missions were notably unsuccessful. The Wirraways continued to fight in most theatres of the war.

The aircraft problem was addressed by importing a huge variety of often unsuitable aircraft. By the end of the war the RAAF had over 70 types of aircraft on inventory. Initially defence relied on the Wirraway and the rugged P40 Kittyhawk. One valuable choice was the Catalina. Johnston devotes space to this remarkable aircraft and its many missions including the vital and often dangerous job of rescuing downed aircrew. With the arrival of Lockheed’s Hudson twin engined bomber the RAAF finally had an aircraft that allowed them to patrol the islands and the seas around them. Initially their work was mostly reconnaissance patrols but it developed into vital ship-attack work as the war progressed and the aircraft improved.

The men trained in combat in Europe became an asset since they could pass on their knowledge to new recruits. Others like Clive Caldwell and “Bluey” Truscott could go into combat in the Pacific and train their men “from the front”. Eventually 130,000 airmen passed through the training schools. Most of their war was fought over the oceans and islands. Navigation was critical, as were twin-engined aircraft for reliability.

Incidentally Johnston gives credit to the volunteers of the Womens Air Training Corps, a largely forgotten group. He lists many of the roles they performed and they must have been a great addition to the thousands of support people needed. There was opposition, though. Most WATC work was initially done on a volunteer basis but when a motion was put before parliament to make their positions official the leader of the Opposition is quoted as saying “the Air Force is a man’s job, anyway”. Their skill base was widened to include such areas as aircraft maintenance and Johnston notes that by 1945 77% of Air Force positions were open to women.

Johnston covers the lack of experienced officers in the RAAF. In Britain operations were run solely by British officers so Australia was left with a gap in planning and management experience at a squadron level and higher. This was not helped by some of the strange beliefs of the British. In early 1941 the RAF Commander-in-Chief Far East was still reassuring the increasingly disbelieving Australian Cabinet that the Japanese were not really air-minded and their aircraft were not very good. As the probability of war increased an Australian squadron was moved to Malaya. Others were spread around bases like Rabaul. In Malaya the Australian squadron leader was then replaced by an RAF officer, causing increasing friction. The British ego suffered a huge blow with the fall of Singapore. Australia turned to the U.S. and received advanced aircraft and technical help. Australian squadrons were gradually returning to the mainland where a new command structure was developing.

With the background set, Johnston then looks at individual experiences of the aircrews. He starts with the Japanese invasion at Kota Bharu, from where Australian reconnaissance aircraft spotted the invasion fleet. The now well trained air and ground crews gave a good account of themselves, sinking a number of ships and barges in the fleet. The remains of the Japanese fleet were forced to withdraw. An example of the stress of the fighting:

“Tom Livesey, his ribs heavily strapped, accidentally knocked off his own undercarriage on a sandbank on takeoff, then found himself taking on six Oscars (a Nakajima fighter, in some ways superior to the Zero). Shrapnel struck his calves and an ankle, while bullets ripped into his engine and cockpit. “Friendly” Bofors guns tried to shoot him down, too, but he survived this and a belly landing”. It was probably not the best day of his life.

As the Japanese attacked the Malay airfields there are tales of desperate fighting and heroic action by the small number of fighter aircraft left. Gradually the squadrons withdrew to Singapore where they suffered further at the hands of the superior Japanese aircraft numbers as well as artillery bombardment, as the airfields were in range of field guns on the mainland. Finally the squadrons were all withdrawn to the Dutch East Indies, leaving Singapore open to air attack but preventing a fruitless war of attrition.

Johnston also chronicles some examples of inexperienced Australian ground crews under fire. These are not flattering but they are still a part of the unsanitised history of the war in Malaya. The deficiencies of the old Buffaloes and Wirraways were obvious in air to air combat but the Wirraway was still valuable in a low level attack role. This rugged little aircraft is worth a book by itself.

As control of the RAAF was wrested from the British changes were being made. Aircraft were stretched to provide some sort of cover to the many airfields and military bases. In spite of this, offensive missions were undertaken. Regular combat was being fought over the Bismarck Sea and the major shipping routes that were used to reinforce the Japanese. Enemy airfields were attacked. Decent aircraft were now being built that could carry the war effectively to the enemy. Even the Lockheed Hudson, a converted airliner, was turned into an attack bomber to replace the slow, clumsy Avro Ansons.

After U.S. carriers moved into the area and Macarthur began his “island-hopping” campaign the USAAF came to dominate the eastern Pacific theatre. The RAAF was incorporated into the Allied war effort under Macarthur but Australian squadrons continued to run long distance ocean patrols, attack shipping at masthead heights and supporting landings along the Papuan coast and among the islands. The Japanese had to be supplied by sea and every freighter, barge and troopship was at risk of an Australian air attack. To avoid air attack they had to move further out into the Pacific, but this gave the American submarines a turn at them. The reminiscences of the pilots and aircrew tell the history of this period far better than the official reports and Johnston again lets their words carry the feel of combat. The stories are often told in a laconic style that belies the deadly nature of the combat.

Amazingly the lessons of Darwin had not sunk in. The major forward base of Port Moresby was undefended by fighter planes yet if taken by the Japanese it would be a base from which their bombers could attack ports in Queensland. For some time it suffered regular bombing raids until finally a squadron of Kittyhawks was sent there. Even so, the squadron was inadequate and underequipped for some time. The mechanics and riggers had few tools and no buildings to work in. At least the squadron proved a morale booster for the locals. Johnston gives an almost day by day description of the actions based on Port Moresby. The reports cover a tremendous range of attacks, defence sorties, crashes and lost pilots. Australian bases were under regular attack from advanced Japanese airfields and many aircraft were lost on both sides. The reports show the Australians becoming more confident in their combat techniques but more Spitfires were lost in collisions and accidents than to enemy attack. The superb coordination from the ground developed during the Battle of Britain was noticeably missing.

At a higher level there were problems with conflicts within the leadership, a high command that was hopeless at administering and supplying its Air Force, and cliques that developed among some pilots. There seems to have been a remnant of the ludicrous British class structure infecting some officers at this time. An entire squadron was accused of being cowardly “dingoes” because they allegedly would not close with the enemy in a dogfight. Saburo Sakai, the leading Japanese fighter pilot, praised the bravery and willingness of the Australian pilots to close with the Japanese. General Macarthur felt that Australians were cowards but that opinion gradually changed as major low level attacks became more effective against Japanese shipping and land bases. One pilot returned from a low level raid on Penfui airstrip with a length of the radio mast embedded in his wing. Many others didn’t return, having been shot down, caught and executed.

The Bristol Beaufighter gave the RAAF a new weapon to which Johnston rightly devotes space. The powerful, quiet Beaufighter with its long range and weaponry load of machine guns, cannon, bombs and rockets became the bane of the enemy. Its quiet approach on an attack run led to its being christened “Whispering Death” by some. Again the pilots’ reminiscences are a valuable in understanding the methods and strategies of attack.

The RAAF was always regarded as a subservient air force, first by the British and then by the Americans. Macarthur wanted to split the U.S. Air Force from the joint command and to relabel the RAAF as Coastal Defence Command. This idea was fought by the government, but it set the tone for Macarthur’s attitude to the RAAF. Henceforth all the more public events would be done by Americans. Fortunately his new officer in charge of the air forces, General Kenny, was a better leader. His inspection tours of RAAF bases earned him the respect of the airmen. After the Milne Bay landings Australian – American respect increased no matter what their Supreme Commander thought, as a result of the RAAF’s effective support of the ground troops. Australian and American planes controlled the seas around Papua and New Guinea preventing resupply of the garrisons and harassing the airfields. This sometimes involved shooting at Japanese soldiers in the water, a practice that airmen carried out with mixed emotions. Although Macarthur and Halsey took the main targets the RAAF, RNZAF and the remains of the Dutch East Indies Air Force tidied up the bypassed targets. Johnston makes the point that this was as much because the Allied aircraft were now secondrate designs and there were too few of them for major actions. They were also better at small low level attacks, whereas the U.S. bombers were becoming specialised in high level area bombing. The Australian pilots, however, felt left behind by the Yanks and brassed off at being given heavily defended targets like airfields that were now of little strategic value. Many pilots and aircrew didn’t survive this part of the war. Morale was low, supplies and transport hard to obtain. Such airpower as the Japanese still had was mostly directed against the beachheads in the Philippines. Johnston gives a good analysis of this period and the feelings of the pilots.

His concluding chapter pretty well sums up the RAAF’s Pacific War. He offers credible reasons for the actions and problems, as well as discussing the politics and power struggles. He fills in many gaps in the popular conception of the war and covers the good and the bad in an impartial way.

The book also includes appendices on aircraft type identification, casualty and victory totals, kills listed by pilot and kill claims, and a comprehensive glossary. The final appendix is a thorough list of the references used, as is appropriate in a work like this. It is to Johnston’s credit that he has not written the book as an academic tome but has made it readable by leaving this information until the end.

Mark Johnston PhD is currently Head of History at Scotch College in Melbourne. Australian military history is his passion, resulting in eight books. This one is a worthy addition to Australia’s war histories.

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