The Road to Iwo Jima: Part 2

DV1

Web: http://www.dv1.com.au

R4 DVD

3-DVD set

276 minutes.

All Regions.

Reviewer: Bob Estreich

Part 1 of this series covered the reasons for the Pacific War, the early losses, and the eventual turning around of the Japanese as the Allies developed new tactics and moved resources into the area. “Island hopping” was seen as a more practical method of reaching Japan than an attack up the south-east Asian coast. Early island invasions, although costly in men and materiel, showed that such a method was practical. The importance of sea power and air superiority was recognized, and the carrier became the major naval vessel in lieu of the battleship.

The second series starts with the invasion of Kwajalein atoll. Although in the end some islands were taken almost without resistance, the U.S. preparations were based on a spirited Japanese defence such as they had experienced on Tarawa. The landing area was subjected to massive naval and aerial bombardment so the landings could be carried out without too much opposition. Instead the soldiers found themselves faced with “spiderhole” warfare – many small trenches and bunkers containing a few defenders each. Warfare was reduced almost to a man-to-man level. Battles were fought by small groups on the initiative of their commanders, rather than as a coordinated whole, as communications broke down badly. The reports of individual soldiers convey the difficulty of this sort of warfare. Weapons like the grenade and flamethrower were critical in clearing out spiderholes in the debris caused by the bombardment. Photos of the bombardment are impressive, and the film taken by the combat cameramen accompanying the forward troops gives an impressive picture of the difficulties of this type of warfare.

From Kwajalein, the documentary takes a look at Burma. Another of the lesser known battle areas. Burma was seen as a point to stop the Japanese advance through south-east Asia, and a possible launching zone for attacks against Japan via China. Unfortunately the coverage begins with the arrival of U.S. troops in the theatre, giving the impression of an almost all-U.S. campaign. The British had been forced out of Burma and back to India by bad weather, poor supplies and transport, the debilitating climate, and a style of jungle fighting that they were untrained for. The same problems were to affect the U.S. troops. At least they could overcome the supply problems with the air drop techniques they had perfected in New Guinea, but the difficulties of crossing the Himalayas with enough fuel and ammunition to supply the Chinese troops were more than they could handle. The logistics of supplying ground troops in large numbers in the jungles were never quite overcome.

The U.S. commander, General Stilwell, seems to have been every bit as unprepared as his troops. Chennault and Merrill, two U.S. commanders of guerilla and Chinese troops, achieved some useful results, but in the end the Burma war became a backwater. There are some inaccuracies in the film footage in this section. If the troops are shown in Australian uniforms with Australian unit patches, carrying Australian weapons, they are probably not Americans.

Next we move back to the invasion of Saipan and Tinian. These islands were critical to Japan as they were the base for the defence of sea traffic between south-east Asia and Japan. They were in range of support by Japanese land based bomber fleets and this gave the Japanese the idea that if the U.S. fleet could be lured into these waters it could be destroyed by the bombers. Japan had few carriers left at this point but was well aware of the U.S. reliance on carrier air support. Saipan had been progressively fortified over the previous decade, and would be a tough nut to crack even for the well supported U.S. Marines. Admiral Nagumo, who had led the Pearl Harbor attack, was in charge of the island defences. The leader of the U.S. forces was Admiral Spruance, the commander of the carrier fleets at Pearl Harbor. He had had the unpleasant experience of sailing his carriers back into Pearl just after the bombing, and seen the pride of the U.S. Navy burning or sunk. Spruance knew Saipan would be difficult, and his fleet contained seven battleships for coastal bombardment. Some of these had been resurrected from the waters of Pearl, and the coming battle was becoming personal for many sailors.

Spruance’s first move was a lightning attack on the Japanese airfields that destroyed most of their heavy bomber fleet. With this threat removed, he set about pulverizing the beachheads and the landings took place in a fairly orderly manner. So fast was their advance, supported by tanks and light artillery, that ir was two nights before the Japanese could organize a counter attack. Night attacks had previously achieved some success against U.S. troops, but this time the communications were working properly. The battleships fired starshells over the battlefields and the advantage of darkness was lost.

The Japanese navy decided to move its fleet to the Marianas to take on the U.S. fleet, They were intercepted by two U.S. carrier fleets, with a further two fleets tasked to destroy the airfields from which the Japanese had expected air support. The resulting battle became known as the “Marianas Turkey Shoot” and the superior U.S. forces destroyed the remaining Japanese naval forces and most of its remaining air power.

Back on Saipan the troops were experiencing massed suicide charges by Japanese soldiers. They were horrified, too, by the suicides of many Japanese civilians who had been warned to expect U.S atrocities against them. .The battle was concluded, but after a total loss of life of around 50,000 – the most costly battle so far.

With the lessons learned about spiderhole fighting, the U.S used napalm for the first time on the island of Tinian to burn out the spiderholes. The island was taken in a seven day campaign and quickly converted to a major U.S. airbase.

The island of Pelelieu marked a change in Japanese tactics. It was important to the defence of Japanses supply lines to the Philippines, where Macarthur had made his much publicised return. The Philippines was also seen as an alternative point from which to attack Japan if the island hopping proved too costly. Pelelieu had to be neutralized.

The Japanese commander realized this too. Convinced that the U.S. naval bombardment could breach any coastal defences he could put up, he opted for carefully placed defences in depth inland. His idea was to catch the invading troops in a war of attrition that could cause them to negotiate a peace. As the invading forces got ever closer to japan, the peace movement was gradually taking over influence from the unsuccessful military, so his strategy made sense.

It almost worked. Troops landed with token opposition, but soon found themselves being bled by well designed Japanese gun emplacements, skillfully coordinated counter attacks, and well laid out fields of fire. Although the tanks and antitank guns of the U.S. forces proved their worth, the attacks bogged down as the Japanese had anticipated.

The film clips of these battles are disappointing. They do not appear to have had any cleaning up done on them, but clips in the first series showed the benefits of this. Once again many clips are repeated as filler. The narration of the battles is excellent and comprehensive, so I suppose some footage had to be repeated to fill in the narration, but when you see the same ship firing the same shot five times in a few minutes it becomes noticeable.. This is, however, a minor letdown in the otherwise excellent detailed coverage of the battles and their tactics. Again, quotes from the individual reports are used to give the fighting a more personal touch. The ferocity of the fighting obviously affected many soldiers deeply.

The documentary next looks at the Philippines, particularly the main island of Luzon. Although it was not to be a major target in the advance on Japan, the U.S. decided it had to be taken to neutralize a large Japanese occupying force and to regain prestige lost in the area when the Japanese took control from the U.S. Unlike the island campaigns, it was a good location for large scale warfare and huge land movements. In spite of poor planning the main areas of the island were taken, although the capital city of Manila was heavily damaged in the fighting.

Mopping up the rest of the island took far longer. With the Japanese forces now cut off from their homeland the fighting became a savage last stand for their troops as they were pushed back into prepared positions in the mountains.

The island of Okinawa was commanded by the able General Kuribayashi, in command of 29,000 troops. He also opted for a policy of attrition. It was to be the most costly campaign of the war and since it was fought on Japanese homeland soil the defence was ferocious. The attack was preceded by massive bombing attacks to remove the remaining Japanese planes, then a force of 154,000 men was landed. The northern part of the island was taken in fifteen days, but the Japanese troops concentrated in the mountainous northwest and were well prepared for a long campaign. Meanwhile kamikaze attacks on the U.S. fleet reached a frenzy, with attacks of up to 350 aircraft. Three carriers were lost and other damaged to the point that they had to be withdrawn from the invasion support. Worse, the remaining Japanese Navy units led by the massive battleship Yamato went to sea in a one-way suicide mission to destroy the invasion fleet.

These last-ditch efforts failed, and the island was eventually taken. It effectively marked the end of the Pacific war, because most of the Japan home islands were now in range of the B29 bombers. The Japanese navy and Air Force were destroyed, their supply lines cut, and the homeland was practically undefended. In the end the atomic bombs finished off the war.

Overall, this documentary series has much to recommend it. It gives many parts of the war a personal touch, and the explanation of tactics is the best I have seen. The politics behind the war, on both sides, is valuable and I have not seen this depth of explanation before. In spite of the repetition of some clips, much of the footage is new or well cleaned up and does credit to the detailed narration. It is good to see the minor battle theatres discussed as well. Tactically these may have turned out to be less important than the island hopping war, but they served first to stop the Japanese advance , then to offer an alternative path for invasion if needed, then to cut off essential war supplies to Japan. It is this comprehensive coverage that makes the series so valuable.