The Campaign in Greece 1941
Peter Ewer
Scribe Publications
Web: http://www.scribepublications.com.au
Reviewer: Bob Estreich
Most Australians and New Zealanders
associate ANZAC with the combined army Corps that invaded Turkey at Gallipoli
during World War 1. Few know that a second Australia and New Zealand Army Corps
was established during the brief fighting in Greece during World War 2. The
similarities between the two campaigns are startling, and Peter Ewer now gives
us a tremendously detailed account of this almost forgotten part of the War.
To understand how the debacle happened it
is helpful to know the state of military thinking in Britain at the time, and
the book gives us an excellent rundown. Australia had a small air force of its
own, but due to an arrangement called the Empire Air Training Scheme it was
only producing trained pilots for secondment to the RAF for the battles in
Europe. There were no aircraft under Australian command in the Mediterranean.
Australian Navy ships had likewise been transferred to British command for the
duration of the War, a necessary condition for Australia to obtain warships
from Britain in the previous peace period.
Australian troops were sent to Egypt in
reasonable numbers but they were underequipped. The British were to equip them
on their arrival but following the disaster at Dunkirk the British were short
of materiel. Most of their heavy weapons had been left behind. There were few
tanks or aircraft available and what they had was largely needed for the
defence of Britain.
British ground troops were still organised
in a way that would be more practical for trench warfare. Their armoured
vehicles were used to replace cavalry and not to assist ground troops in
action. Their heavy automatic weapons were likewise formed into their own
companies and not spread among the troops where they would be more use. Most
commanders of these groups jealously guarded their independence and overall
coordination was almost non-existent, despite the recent lessons received in
France at the hands of Guderian’s Panzers. The British commanders were
generally out of date in their tactical thinking and had no concept of the speed
of a modern mobile war.
Perhaps their worst feature was Winston
Churchill. Historians point out that Hitler’s biggest mistake was taking
control of his country’s military when he had no aptitude or training for such
a role. Neither did Churchill. He was responsible for the botched invasion of
Gallipoli in World War 1 but survived the subsequent enquiry. As a result he
was now in a position to repeat his blunder. The Germans threatened an invasion
of Greece through Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia which would directly threaten
Egypt and Palestine. To encourage the Greeks to resist and to “neutralise”
Turkey by tying down its troops, Churchill sent his Foreign Minister, Anthony
Eden, to promise the Greeks military support. The promises were substantially
empty as there simply weren’t enough forces to go around. Aircraft particularly
were in desperately short supply and were too obsolete to oppose the
Luftwaffe..
Wavell, the British commander in Egypt,
was ordered to send troops to Greece, which he reluctantly split off from his
North Africa forces. The troops were mainly seasoned Australians and New
Zealanders, with some British tank support and heavy machine guns. They were
under the command of General Blamey (Australian) and General Freyberg (New
Zealand). They had barely arrived in Greece when the Germans invaded.
The rest of the dreadful story is well
told in the book, especially from personal accounts of the soldiers. It is a
story of poorly-equipped, uncoordinated, undersupplied men with no air cover fighting desperately
against superior odds. A fighting withdrawal down through the mountains of
Greece was soon the only alternative and many battles were fought in hostile
terrain to achieve this. Most of their heavy equipment was lost during this
retreat as Blamey ordered all motorised transport back to the rear. It was
during this retreat that the remaining Australian and NZ troops formed into the
2nd Anzac Corps under Blamey.
Blamey led his forces valiantly from as
far to the rear as possible. The British leadership was no better. The
political promises of support were empty as Churchill had quietly notified his
commander in Egypt that nothing must stand in the way of taking North Africa,
and he should not waste resources on the Greek campaign. The Greek Army fought
as well as it could, but, betrayed by Churchill, were in no better position.
Only the New Zealand General Freyberg came out of the campaign with any honour.
He led his men from the front and had a better grasp of what was happening than
Blamey. To his credit Blamey’s original plan was to put a defensive line across
the narrow part of Greece near Mount Olympus. This decision was overruled by
Eden’s promise to provide support for Greek troops at the border so the
defensive line was never built. Had it been ready in time it would probably
have worked. Such defenses as were built were inadequate as the New Zealanders
had to use much of their barbed wire and land mines along the border defences
instead.
In the end, like so many actions, the war
broke down into a series of savage local actions between lower level
commanders. The British troops fought well and the fragmentation of their
armour and machine guns among the front line troops proved the correctness of
this doctrine. In the end, though, there just weren’t enough of them to go
around and gradually the perimeter contracted around coastal ports near Larisa.
An example of the type of battle being fought was the action at Servia Pass,
traditionally a main entry point to southern Greece. It is well documented in
the book. A small rearguard mounted a defence of the Pass. At least they now
had the benefit of the rising ground on their side. With the bridge across the
Aliakmon River destroyed by New Zealand engineers and their troops covering the
river, the Germans were forced to try to fight through the Pass. With adequate
concentration of British heavy machine guns and N.Z. artillery even advancing
German armour was halted by ambushes in the Pass.
In other actions on the slopes of Mount
Olympus the Germans had more luck, being able to infiltrate small groups into
the NZ lines under cover of day fog and mist. The fighting was savage and often
hand to hand. The Maori soldiers held their posts until they were surrounded
and other NZ companies went back to help them evacuate. Holding actions like
this allowed the rest of the Anzac troops to withdraw.
One weak area remained. A`group of New
Zealand soldiers was assigned to guard railway line that runs around the
eastern flank of Mt Olympus and passes through a long tunnel. Their orders were
to blow up the tunnel if the Germans tried to move south along the line. They
were poorly equipped but did their best to blow in the tunnel with a depth
charge and antitank mines. Blamey thought the panzers would not be strong
enough to traverse the rugged terrain leading to the tunnel so this area was
largely ignored, but if the Germans could get past it they would have an easier
run to Larisa where most of the withdrawal preparations were centred. The
German 3 Panzer Regiment was given the job. It was more ably led and better
equipped than its opponents. When the
N.Z. troops reported about 100 tanks on the plains below, Blamey merely called
for an aerial reconnaissance to verify a German presence. The NZ line was
spread so thinly that at night they could not stop the German infiltration, and
the tanks were quite able to traverse the rough goat tracks of the area. One NZ
company was forced to surrender and others to retreat. Finally the NZ leader
was forced to give up the ground and try to get his remaining troops out. He
was aided by the minefields his men had laid. The Germans had to stop and clear
them and their advance gradually petered out as they waited for a road to be
prepared around the blown-up tunnel.
The leapfrogging retreat worked reasonably
well and most troops were able to get into the ports around Larisa, where the
Royal Navy did brilliant but dangerous convoy runs at night to take troops out
to Crete. Although 50,000 men were eventually evacuated from Greece,
Churchill’s military folly had cost 611 Anzacs dead and 3,644 made prisoner.
Churchill’s response was to tell Wavell that it was “a glorious episode in the
history of Britain”.
Most survivors finished up in Crete, with
much of their heavy weapons and personal kit lost. Crete had a small garrison
force, essentially British non-combatant support units. On his arrival the
competent Freyberg was put in control of the island’s defences. His assets were
few – the garrison units had few fighting men, he had no maps or knowledge of
the island and the state of maintenance of his ex-Greece troops was pitiful. At
least his men could now be fed and rested. Critically, though, he had no idea
of the size of the opposing forces. As this information started to arrive he
was appalled at what he would be facing. Knowing by now that there would be
little help from the British, Freyburg contacted his Government directly asking
for urgent support. The NZ government contacted Churchill, who made the usual
placatory noises. Freyburg received no aircraft, few reinforcements, and a
small number of obsolete artillery pieces captured from the Italians and
French. A stock of modern British 25-pounder guns remained safely in Egypt
where they were being kept for the resumption of action in North Africa.
The lack of air cover which had proved
such a problem in Greece was not addressed in Crete either, even though
military intelligence was certain the island would face invasion by paratroops.
Freyberg accordingly organised what defences he had to defend major airfields
and the port of Suda Bay.At least paratroops would not land unopposed. If the
airfields could be held, resupply would
be difficult for the Germans. He also made preparations for defence in areas
where a likely German sea invasion could be expected. The Germans quickly
reduced his small air cover to nine aircraft and Freyberg ordered the remainder
back to Egypt, realising that they were outnumbered and outclassed by the
Germans. He intended to mine the airfields against enemy airborne landings but
was overruled on the ground that the RAF might wish to return to them one day.
This single small detail may have tipped the coming battle against the Germans
had he been allowed to complete it.
The invasion duly came and it was costly
for the Germans. They came in low and they were within the range of small arms
fire. Their slow gliders were raked by machinegun fire as they passed,
paratroops were shot out of the air as they descended. The gliders were able to
land (or crash land) on the unmined airstrips, and gradually the Germans got a
toehold on the island. The result was never in doubt once they took the first
airfield. Supplies were landed speedily and they proceeded to mop up the rest
of the island.
The defence was simply spread too thinly
to provide serious opposition and Crete finished up like Greece – the defenders
were forced into steady fighting withdrawals. Freyberg could not even command
the British garrison forces – they retained their independence to the end.
Gradually, however, the situation stabilised then turned in the favour of the
defenders. Admiral Cunningham’s naval fleet held off a seaborne German
supporting invasion.
Finally the battle came down to Maleme
airfield, in German hands. If it could be retaken the German resupply efforts
would cease. It didn’t work. Dogged by poor signals, lack of air support, no
supporting armour, and an almost limitless supply of fresh German troops being
landed and sent straight into battle, the attack foundered. Wavell refused any
more reinforcements. Once again the navy beat off another seaborne invasion at
some cost to its own ships, but it wasn’t enough. By now the fresh German
ground troops were forcing the defenders back towards Suda in a disorganised
withdrawal. Finally Wavell accepted the reality and gave permission for the
island to be abandoned. Again the navy did a sterling job evacuating troops
from Heraklion while under air attack and suffering heavy losses.
The remaining troops were given the option
– surrender or try to get off the island by their own resources. Once again
little bands of survivors trekked across the mountains hoping to find a small
port where a ship might take them to safety. Some made it. 4,794 Anzacs were
captured and 945 were buried. Churchill’s comment was “We have paid our debt of
honour with far less loss than I feared”. He then ordered Wavell to get on with
the war in Africa as if nothing had happened. The failure of the campaign must
be laid firmly on Churchill. He had hoped to impress the Americans with a
valiant military action in Greece, but all he did was lose lives, delay the
North African offensive while the Army was resupplied, and delay the
reinforcement of Singapore.
Peter Ewer is to be thoroughly commended
for this book. He hides nothing, even the weaknesses of the Australian and NZ
soldiers and their commanders. The book is valuable in how it relates the Greek
campaign to the war in other parts of the world. It doesn’t excuse Churchill’s,
Wavell’s or Blamey’s incompetent behaviour but it does at least show what was
distracting them, and their motivations for handling the campaign so badly.
Finally, by using the words of the troops
themselves, Ewer provides a very personal insight into the campaign. It left
its mark on many troops. My father and my uncle were two of them. Neither
talked much about the campaign, and I can see now why they were reluctant. My
father was one of the evacuees, my uncle was one of those captured. This book
goes a long way to explaining to me what happened. Without the book the Greece
campaign would be just another little backwater in the history of WW2. The book
draws a striking picture of an unappreciated Anzac campaign, and it is timely,
too. Australia is once more becoming rather heavily involved in other people’s
wars. Without reminders like this we may be doomed to make the same mistakes
again.
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