An Awkward Truth

The Bombing of Darwin February 1942

Peter Grose

Allen & Unwin 2010

The bombing of Darwin during World War II is an area of Australian history that has largely been ignored or treated with an embarrassed silence. It is true that it was a tragedy full of errors, poor leadership and low morale. It is also true that there were heroes during the raids, many of whom received no recognition at all. Part of the reason the true situation is largely unknown is due to the Government’s playing down of the raids on the basis of “National Security” on the advice of its military advisers. Peter Grose sets out to correct the misconceptions and provide as much factual information as possible. At this distance from the event it is possible to view it more dispassionately than it was at the time, so the book is timely.

Grose has drawn on the records of Douglas Lockwood, a journalist stationed in what was then a news backwater. Lockwood was there during the bombing and provided his own firsthand experience. As a trained journalist he was also able to get information from many of the major participants – in a small town like Darwin Lockwood knew everyone. Grose has not stopped there, however. He also obtained information from diverse sources such as Mitsuo Fuchida, the leader of the bombing raids. From these people he has managed to obtain a reasonably accurate outline of the raids – numbers of aircraft and so on. Some of his figures are vague, such as casualty numbers, but he explains the basis for his final figures and they appear convincing.

I was surprised to learn that the carrier task force that bombed Darwin was the same one that hit Pearl Harbour about eight weeks earlier and had just taken Rabaul. They used the same tactics as before and obtained the same surprise. Their enemy, the Australians and U.S., made the same mistakes and were just as unprepared for the attack. Once again there was sufficient warning of the incoming aircraft but the sighting was misinterpreted and no action was taken. Once again the first indication of battle was when the bombs started falling. Unlike Pearl Harbour the town’s critical infrastructure like the Post Office was hit directly and civilian casualties were high.

Grose pulls no punches in his book. It falls into roughly four sections. In the first he discusses the people and what preparations they had made. The Northern Territory Administrator does not come off well in his evaluation, but Grose tries to treat him fairly. Areas of the Administrator’s responsibility like Air Raid warning and emergency planning was inadequate or non-existent. Thanks to administrative bungling over authority and pay, Darwin had no official Civil Defence organisation, only a loose (and secret) agreement between the military and the ex-Civil Defence wardens.

In the second section Grose gives a compelling account of the raid itself. Rather than Lockwood’s single impression he is able to discuss the raid from many perspectives including that of the Japanese fliers. Such defences as there were fought back valiantly but they were too few and poorly equipped. This is where the heroism came through from some people – the pilot of the only surviving Kittyhawk fighter aircraft is one.

The third section deals with the aftermath. This is probably the most shameful period that Australia has endured during any war. There was little leadership and that was incompetent. The Administrator, who should have been organising medical relief and basic civil defence measures, was more concerned with getting the official silverware and cutlery and his collection of wines to safety. To do this he demanded the services of up to four badly-needed civil policemen to pack and guard his belongings. He paid much less attention to the disintegration of his town. In the information vacuum left by his complete abdication of responsibility rumours abounded. The critical one was that orders had been given for all civilians to evacuate Darwin. Thus began the shameful race south on the limited road and train lines available. People who were critical to the continued operation of the town were heading south as fast as they could go.

The military fared no better. The RAAF commanding officer decided that instead of preparing for further raids and preparing what defences he could salvage from his battered airfield he should arrange for all personnel to leave the base and camp in the bush until the base water supply could be restored. The orders were misunderstood and the base staff also headed south. The Military Police who should have been helping the town police to keep order and control the looting were led by a man who was chronically drunk. The Provos therefore indulged in an orgy of looting on their own behalf. The civil police, believing a rumour that the town was now under military control, felt powerless to stop it. The strongly unionised wharfies and sailors from the sunken ships were either heading south or living on the beach from supplies that floated ashore. They were no help at all in the rescue efforts since there was no leadership from their unions. Grose spares nobody – if criticism is due he highlights it and backs it up with evidence.

Finally, as is usually the case, some minor officers in critical areas came to the forefront and got things organised or back in order. Suitable refugees were ordered back to Darwin to handle the clearing of streets. Communications were put back in order, the dead were collected and buried (often in mass graves) and Darwin was at least a little better prepared for the many raids that followed.

The fourth section covers the politics. The Government had only been in power for a short time and was currently fighting a diplomatic battle with Churchill for the return of two Australian divisions from Africa and the Middle East to defend Australia and New Guinea. The attacks on Darwin were an unwelcome diversion and they had little information on what had happened anyway. They released what they knew to the newspapers but as the casualties and damage estimates rose “National Security” came into play and the true results were played down. They did, however, establish an Enquiry which detailed as much evidence as possible from eyewitnesses. This report is the basis of many of Grose’s figures. Its testimony shows how many people played down or played up their role to reduce the blame falling on them. Perhaps the best example of covering your backside came from the Administrator’s testimony. Quite simply, the man appears to have lied under oath and Grose is able to refute some of his testimony with more reliable evidence. He has included relevant sections from the Enquiry’s report in the book.

Grose interweaves all these threads to give a fascinating and detailed account of the raids. It is not just a dry history and he even manages to inject a little sarcastic humour at times:

“The banks had gone. Shops were shut and deserted. So were hotels. Looting was rife. The civil police felt sidelined. The military police were out of control. The Adminstrator’s port, sherry and other fine wines were in safe hands. Otherwise, Darwin was a mess”.

An Awkward Truth is a fine and detailed book about an event we should by now be able to look back on as a part of our history. It IS an important part of our history and should no longer be regarded as awkward. There are lessons to be learned from it, particularly from Grose’s examples of what happened when organization and authority broke down. He also makes one important observation about releasing information to the public:

“The Australian Government railed endlessly about public indifference to the war effort. The full horror of the attack on Darwin was its best chance to jolt Australians out of their apathy. Unwisely, it chose not to take it”.

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